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Securities have replaced bank lending in recent years
as the primary means through which funds are
invested internationally, and in the process, the share
of U.S. securities owned by foreigners has grown
markedly. For example, between December 1974 and
June 2002, the proportion of the value of outstanding
U.S. equities and long-term debt securities that was
foreign-owned increased from about 5 percent to
about 12 percent.1 During the same period, the value
of these foreign holdings increased from $67 billion
to almost $4 trillion.
U.S. holdings of foreign long-term securities have
also increased over this period, although their growth
has not matched the rapid growth in foreign holdings
of U.S. long-term securities. At $1.8 trillion, the
value of U.S. holdings of foreign long-term securities
at the end of 2002 was less than half the value
of foreign holdings of U.S. securities; this difference
resulted in a negative net international position in
long-term securities of $2.3 trillion. This disparity is
also reﬂected in the more comprehensive U.S. inter-
national investment position, which is the value of all
U.S. holdings of foreign assets minus the value of all
foreign holdings of U.S. assets (chart 1). On this more
comprehensive basis, the United States has for some
years been the world’s largest net debtor country. In
recent years, the path of the net international invest-
ment position has closely mirrored that of the net
long-term securities position.
The U.S. system for measuring cross-border invest-
ment in long-term securities consists of annual sur-
veys measuring holdings of securities and monthly
reports measuring transactions in securities.2 The
data are part of the Treasury International Capital
(TIC) reporting system (www.treas.gov/tic). The data
on holdings are collected on a security-by-security
basis, whereas the transactions data are collected on
an aggregated basis. Because the holdings data are
security-speciﬁc, they permit extensive veriﬁcation
and are thus considered highly reliable. But because
the data require thorough editing, they are available
only after a lag of about one year. The transactions
data, in contrast, are available after only forty-ﬁve
days; they provide information on the magnitude and
geography of recent cross-border ﬂows as well as a
broad categorization of the types of instruments giv-
ing rise to these ﬂows. Estimates of securities hold-
1. Hereafter we will refer to this set of instruments, whether of
foreign or U.S. origin, as long-term securities. Long-term debt has an
original maturity of more than one year. All holdings of securities
mentioned in this report pertain to portfolio investment holdings and
exclude direct investment holdings. Direct investment means the
ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one person or by a
group of afﬁliated persons, of 10 percent or more of the voting stock
of an incorporated business enterprise, or an equivalent interest in an
unincorporated enterprise.
2. Surveys of foreign holdings of U.S. securities (liabilities) are
conducted as of June 30, and surveys of U.S. holdings of foreign
securities (assets) are conducted as of December 31. The annual
surveys consist of a benchmark survey every ﬁve years and only
slightly smaller sample surveys in the intervening years. The smaller
surveys collect data from the largest reporters in the most recent
benchmark survey that collectively accounted for approximately
90 percent of the data reported on that survey.
1. Net U.S. international investment position and  













NOTE. Direct investment is valued on a current-cost basis. See text note 1
for definition of long-term securities as used here and in subsequent charts. 
SOURCE. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Survey of Current Business; and
the Treasury International Capital reporting system. 
19ings can be updated with the more-recent data on
transactions.3
This article reports the latest survey data on hold-
ings as well as the more-recent transactions data. The
discussion focuses on U.S. cross-border securities
activity, but it also addresses the investment patterns
of some other countries and describes initiatives to
improve the measurement of cross-border securities
investments.
FOREIGN HOLDINGS OF U.S. SECURITIES
The most recent survey results available for foreign
holdings of U.S. long- and short-term securities are as
of June 30, 2002. The survey measure of foreign
holdings was $4.3 trillion, of which $1.4 trillion was
equity, $2.5 trillion was long-term debt, and $0.4 tril-
lion was short-term debt. Residents of Japan and
the United Kingdom were the largest portfolio inves-
tors in U.S. long-term securities by a wide margin
(chart 2). The investment patterns of these two coun-
tries were quite different, however, with U.K. resi-
dents owning slightly more equity than debt and
Japanese residents showing a marked preference for
U.S. debt. These two countries have also been the top
holders of U.S. securities in each of the past four
surveys, with Japan having the largest holdings in
1989 and 1994 and the United Kingdom having the
largest in 2000 (not shown in chart).4
Although data on the total level of foreign holdings
of U.S. securities as measured by the surveys are
considered reliable, the country attribution of these
holdings is far from perfect, mainly because of two
problems. The ﬁrst problem arises when the foreign
owner of a U.S. security entrusts the safekeeping of
the security to an institution that is neither in the
United States nor in the foreign owner’s country of
residence. For example, a resident of Germany may
buy a U.S. security and place it in the custody of
a Swiss bank. Normally the Swiss bank will then
employ a U.S.-resident custodian bank to act as
its foreign subcustodian for the security to facilitate
settlement and custody operations. When portfolio
surveys are conducted, information is collected only
from U.S.-resident entities. Thus, the U.S.-resident
bank, acting as the subcustodian of the Swiss bank,
will report this security on the survey. Because the
U.S. bank will typically know only that it is holding
the security on behalf of a Swiss bank, it will report
the security as Swiss-held. Among the countries with
the largest holdings of U.S. securities, ﬁve of them—
Belgium, the Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, Switzer-
land, and the United Kingdom—are ﬁnancial centers
in which substantial amounts of securities owned by
residents of other countries are held in custody. Per-
haps the greatest distortion in country attribution is
reﬂected in the level of holdings attributed to Luxem-
bourg, a country with an estimated gross domestic
product of $20 billion in 2002 that is credited with
holdings of $229 billion.
The second problem affecting country attribution is
caused by bearer, or unregistered, securities. Usually,
little or no information is available on the owners of
these securities because they need not make them-
selves known. Bearer securities generally cannot be
issued in the United States, but U.S. ﬁrms can and do
issue such securities abroad. The vast majority of the
$492 billion in debt securities attributed to owners
whose country of residence is unknown are bearer
securities.
The percentage of U.S. long-term securities that are
foreign-owned has increased signiﬁcantly over time,
particularly in recent years (chart 3, top panel). On
a share basis, foreign investment is highest in U.S.
Treasury securities: Foreign investors owned 41 per-
cent of the total outstanding as of June 30, 2002
(chart 3, second panel). Foreign ofﬁcial institutions,
which consist mainly of central banks and other
3. For a comprehensive discussion of the U.S. system for mea-
suring cross-border securities activity, including a description of the
methodology for computing estimated holdings, see William L.
Griever, Gary A. Lee, and Francis E. Warnock, ‘‘The U.S. Sys-
tem for Measuring Cross-Border Investment in Securities: A
Primer with a Discussion of Recent Developments,’’ Federal
Reserve Bulletin, vol. 87 (October 2001), pp. 633–50, available at
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2001/1001lead.pdf.
4. For ﬁndings from the survey, see www.treas.gov/tic/fpis.html.
2. Foreign holders of U.S. securities, by selected country  






















NOTE. Such holdings by all other countries total $1.4 trillion. 
Long- and short-term debt
Equity
20 Federal Reserve Bulletin Winter 2004foreign government bodies responsible for conduct-
ing monetary policy or stabilizing exchange rates, are
the primary foreign holders of long-term U.S. Trea-
sury securities. We present data for ofﬁcial institu-
tions separately because the motivations of ofﬁcial
and private investors may differ. Foreign ownership
of other classes of U.S. securities ranges from 11 per-
cent to 16 percent of the total outstanding and con-
sists mainly of holdings of foreign private investors
(chart 3, bottom three panels).
FOREIGN INVESTMENT PATTERNS
We gain another useful perspective on foreign hold-
ings of U.S. securities by examining what fraction of
a country’s total investment in securities is held in
U.S. securities and by comparing that fraction with its
holdings of foreign securities more generally. For
data on each country’s total holdings of foreign secu-
rities, we use the 1997 and 2001 Coordinated Port-
folio Investment Surveys (CPIS), discussed later in
this article. As explained in the appendix, we also
compare the CPIS data on holdings of U.S. securities
with our estimates as derived from the U.S. liabilities
surveys.
For estimates of each country’s holdings of domes-
tic equities and domestic long-term debt, we use the
country’s ﬁnancial balance sheets. The holdings of
domestic securities, combined with the CPIS esti-
mates of holdings of foreign securities, give a mea-
sure of each country’s total portfolio investment in
equities and long-term debt. The following charts
include only the countries for which all the relevant
data could be found.
We compare foreign portfolio holdings with a stan-
dard model of portfolio allocation, the international
capital asset pricing model, or ICAPM. If all inves-
tors followed the ICAPM, the proportions of equities
and long-term debt securities in their portfolios would
match the market shares of these securities. For
example, as of year-end 2001, U.S. equities made
up 50 percent of all equities outstanding worldwide
(chart 4, left panel). The U.S. share of the global
long-term debt market was 45 percent (chart 4, right
panel).5 Thus, if U.S. securities were distributed in
foreign portfolios at year-end 2001 according to the
ICAPM allocation, each country would hold 50 per-
cent of its equity portfolio and 45 percent of its
long-term debt portfolio in U.S. securities. To assess
how close foreign portfolios come to this distribution
5. Global long-term debt market shares are staff calculations
derived from unpublished estimates by the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) of domestic long-tem debt and from published BIS
estimates of long-term international debt adjusted to include estimates
of Brady bonds from Merrill Lynch, Size and Structure of the World
Bond Markets: 2002. See John D. Burger and Francis E. Warnock,
‘‘Foreign Participation in Local Currency Bond Markets,’’ Interna-
tional Finance Discussion Papers (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, forthcoming).
3. Foreign holdings of U.S. long-term securities as a share  
of such securities outstanding,  
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Other debt securities
NOTE. Other debt securities are primarily corporate and municipal debt. All
panels show total, official, and private foreign holdings. 
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size of U.S. market
size of global market
Thus, if a country holds half of its equity portfolio in
U.S. equities, the portfolio weight will be 1. A value
of less than 1 implies that the portfolio is under-
weight in U.S. securities relative to the ICAPM distri-
bution; a value of greater than 1 implies that the
portfolio is overweight in U.S. securities.
We perform a similar calculation to determine
whether a country’s total holdings of foreign securi-
ties are consistent with the size of foreign markets,
where the foreign market for each country is deﬁned








size of foreign market
size of global market
In this case, the weight can also be thought of as a
measure of ‘‘home bias,’’ as it will be 1 if the share of
foreign assets in a country’s portfolio equals the
share of foreign assets in the global market. A value
of less than 1 implies an underweight in foreign
securities and a corresponding overweight in domes-
tic securities—that is, home bias.
We can visually portray these portfolio weights for
equities and, for countries for which we have obser-
vations in both 1997 and 2001, the direction of move-
ment of the weights (chart 5). The horizontal axis is
the weight of all foreign equities, and the vertical axis





















Note. The euro area consists of countries that were members of the euro
area as of December 2001: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
Other Asia: China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.
Other Europe: The Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Norway, Poland, the
Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.
Other industrial: Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.
Source. For the equity market, Standard & Poor’s Global Stock Market












5. Portfolio weights of U.S. equities and of all foreign  
equities for selected countries, December 31, 1997  















NOTE. The euro area is a weighted average of countries in the euro area for
which we can construct portfolio weights in both 1997 and 2001: Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. Foreign
securities for the euro area are defined as holdings reported in the
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey for each country excluding
securities of other countries in the euro area. For calculation of the weights
and discussion of the data in relation to the 45-degree line, see text. 
22 Federal Reserve Bulletin Winter 2004is the weight of U.S. equities. For example, the dot
for Hong Kong indicates a considerable underweight
in total foreign equities in 2001 and an even greater
underweight in U.S. equities.
For countries with observations in both 1997 and
2001, the arrows show the direction of movement. A
vertical movement would indicate that although
a country kept the total foreign share of its equity
portfolio unchanged between 1997 and 2001, U.S.
equities gained at the expense of other foreign equi-
ties. A movement along the 45-degree line would
indicate a balanced expansion of U.S. and foreign
equities relative to the portfolio allocation based on
market capitalization. The arrows indicate that all
countries for which we have 1997 data increased
their international diversiﬁcation into both U.S. and
total foreign equities. The increases were notable for
Australia, Canada, Denmark, and Sweden and were
smaller for countries with fairly deep domestic capi-
tal markets (the euro area, Japan, and the United
Kingdom).
We also show the portfolio weights and move-
ments in U.S. and all foreign long-term debt for the
same countries, with the addition of four Asian coun-
tries that were important holders of U.S. long-term
debt in 2001 (chart 6). The portfolio weights of U.S.
long-term debt increased for several countries, but
the results were less uniform than those for equities.
For the United Kingdom and Japan, the weight of
U.S. long-term debt decreased a bit between 1997 and
2001 despite an increase in actual holdings of U.S.
long-term debt over this period.
In sum, greater international diversiﬁcation appears
to have been associated with an increased willing-
ness to hold U.S. equities, but it is difﬁcult to draw a
conclusion about any change in the appetite for hold-
ing U.S. long-term debt. The preponderance of dots
below the 45-degree line does indicate, however, that
most of these countries are more underweight in U.S.
assets than in foreign assets in general.6
Recently researchers have pointed out that the
ICAPM applies only to investors who purchase and
hold freely traded securities in the global market.7 To
compare actual portfolio shares with the ICAPM
distribution, the equity market shares portrayed in
chart 4 should be adjusted for differences in ‘‘ﬂoat’’
in various countries. ‘‘Float’’ refers to the fraction of
each country’s equity that is freely traded. It excludes
equities that are closely held and thus unlikely to be
offered for sale. It also excludes equity that is subject
to foreign ownership restrictions. Making such an
adjustment increases the U.S. share of the global
equity market in 2001 to 58 percent.8 Adjusted for
ﬂoat, the relative underweight in U.S. equities dis-
played for the countries shown in chart 5 would be
somewhat more pronounced.9
U.S. HOLDINGS OF FOREIGN SECURITIES
The most recent survey results available for U.S.
holdings of foreign securities are as of year-end 2001.
The survey measure of U.S. holdings of foreign secu-
rities was $2.3 trillion, of which $1,613 billion was
6. For a recent discussion of the underweight position of U.S.
equities in foreign portfolios, see Carol C. Bertaut and Linda S. Kole,
‘‘What Makes Investors Over- or Underweight? Explaining Interna-
tional Appetites for Foreign Equities’’ (Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, January 2004).
7. See Magnus Dalquist, Lee Pinkowitz, Rene ´ Stultz, and Rohan
Williamson, ‘‘Corporate Governance and the Home Bias,’’ Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, vol. 38 (March 2003),
pp. 87–110.
8. Estimates from Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI)
for June 2000 indicate a ﬂoat of 92 percent for the U.S. and U.K.
equity markets but one of only 80 percent on average for the euro-area
market and one of 65 percent for the Japanese market. See ‘‘MSCI
Consultation Paper on Free Float-Adjusting Constituent Weights and
Increasing the Target Market Representation in Its Indices’’ (MSCI,
September 17, 2000), available at www.msci.com/provisional/
archives/ConsultationPaper.pdf.
9. Because of the prevalence of securities in the U.S. economy,
however, the ICAPM distribution may overstate the relative impor-
tance that foreign investors wish to give U.S. securities. For example,
although the ICAPM gives the United States roughly a 50 percent
weight based on ﬁnancial market size and a 58 percent weight based
on ﬂoat-adjusted market size, a distribution based on relative GDPs















6. Portfolio weights of U.S. long-term debt and of all  
foreign long-term debt for selected countries,  
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NOTE. See note to chart 5. 
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lion was short-term debt. The United Kingdom,
which was by far the ﬁrst choice of U.S. international
investors at the end of 2001, attracted more than
22 percent of all U.S. investment in foreign securities;
it was followed in popularity by Japan and Canada
(chart 7). In the preceding survey, at year-end 1997,
the United Kingdom and Japan had also attracted the
highest and second-highest levels, respectively, of
U.S. investment; the only other U.S. asset survey
showed that as of March 1994 Japan had attracted
the greatest U.S. holdings, followed by the United
Kingdom.10
It is perhaps surprising that Bermuda, a country
with a population of about 65,000 and a GDP of
about $2 billion, attracted $124 billion in U.S. invest-
ment. The size of the U.S. investment primarily
reﬂects the fact that several large institutions have
changed their country of incorporation from the
United States to Bermuda, transforming U.S. hold-
ings of U.S. securities into U.S. holdings of Ber-
mudan securities. Bermuda’s situation highlights an
important fact about the measurement of cross-border
securities holdings: Securities are attributed to coun-
tries on the basis of the country in which a company
is incorporated or otherwise legally established, not
the country of the company’s center of economic
activity.11
Other unusual patterns are also worth highlight-
ing. Data on U.S. holdings of Swiss securities show
$76 billion invested in Swiss equities and only $1 bil-
lion invested in Swiss debt. This ﬁnding reﬂects the
fact that Swiss ﬁrms and Swiss governmental organi-
zations have issued relatively little debt, whereas the
Swiss equity market was the world’s ninth largest at
the end of 2001.12 A high percentage of short-term
debt holdings (those with an original maturity of one
year or less) is attributed to the United Kingdom, a
result, perhaps, of the tendency of internationally
active ﬁnancial ﬁrms to issue short-term debt through
their U.K. ofﬁces. Further, the level of U.S. invest-
ment in Canadian long-term debt securities is unusu-
ally high: The $105 billion ﬁgure represents more
than 20 percent of all U.S. holdings of foreign long-
term debt securities.
Whereas the countries of residence of foreign hold-
ers of U.S. securities are difﬁcult to determine, the
countries of origin of foreign securities held by U.S.
residents are relatively easy to determine and should
be completely accurate. Precise country attribution of
foreign securities is possible because the surveys
collect data on each security held by U.S. owners, and
establishing the country of the issuer of foreign secu-
rities is typically a straightforward process.
U.S. Holdings, by Currency
Both the 1997 and 2001 asset surveys show that U.S.
investors had a strong preference for foreign debt
securities denominated in U.S. dollars; the share
of U.S.-dollar-denominated long-term securities
increased from 58 percent in 1997 to 67 percent
in 2001 (table 1). The preference for U.S.-dollar-
denominated foreign debt was even stronger in short-
term securities: In the 2001 survey, 84 percent of
such holdings were denominated in U.S. dollars.
Almost all of the foreign debt holdings not held in
U.S. dollars were denominated in euros, yen, U.K.
pounds, and Canadian dollars.
U.S. Holdings as a Share of the Total
Outstanding
Data from the 1994, 1997, and 2001 U.S. asset sur-
veys indicate that as U.S. holdings of foreign equities
have increased, so have they increased as a share of
total foreign equity market capitalization: from less
than 6 percent in 1994 to about 10 percent in 1997
and to 11.5 percent in 2001 (table 2). U.S. investors
10. For ﬁndings from the 2001 survey, see www.treas.gov/tic/
fpis.html.
11. This practice is followed to be consistent with international
guidelines on the measurement of balance of payments.
12. The Swiss government has relatively little debt because it does
not tend to run budget deﬁcits. Swiss corporations also have little debt
because of a stamp tax on corporate debt issued in Switzerland. The
tax has prompted Swiss ﬁrms to issue debt securities through their
foreign afﬁliates.
7. U.S. holdings of foreign securities, by selected country  



















NOTE. U.S. holdings of all other foreign securities total $600 billion. 
Long- and short-term debt
Equity
24 Federal Reserve Bulletin Winter 2004notably increased their shares of the equity markets
in the United Kingdom, Japan, and other Asian coun-
tries, but they held a relatively constant fraction of
the Canadian equity market. Although they held pro-
gressively larger dollar amounts of equities of coun-
tries in the euro area, the share of the euro-area equity
market that these holdings represented declined
somewhat in 2001 after increasing from 1994 to
1997. To some extent, differences in the fractions of
foreign equity markets held by U.S. investors reﬂect
differences in the ﬂoat of these countries. Data using
ﬂoat-adjusted estimates of market capitalization show
that in 2001 U.S. investors held about 17 percent
of the U.K. equity market, about 16 percent of the
euro-area market, and a bit under 12 percent of the
Japanese market.13
In contrast to their investment pattern in foreign
equities, U.S. investors have continued to hold a
relatively small fraction of foreign long-term debt
securities (table 3). U.S. investors continue to hold
a notably larger share of the Canadian long-term debt
market than they do of other foreign markets. As with
holdings of foreign equities, the U.S. share of the
U.K. long-term debt market in 2001 was larger than
that of the euro-area market for long-term debt and
larger still than that of the Japanese long-term debt
market.
The rise and fall of holdings shown in table 3 for
‘‘other Asia’’ and ‘‘other’’ countries (the latter of
which include Latin America) from 1994 to 2001
may reﬂect a change in the perceived risk-adjusted
rate of return on emerging-market debt over the
period. Some research indicates that as U.S. investors
moved out of emerging-market debt over the 1997–
2001 period, they did so to a greater degree in coun-
tries (such as some in Southeast Asia and Latin
13. Alan Ahearne, William L. Griever, and Francis E. Warnock,
‘‘Information Costs and Home Bias: An Analysis of U.S. Holdings of
Foreign Equities,’’ Journal of International Economics (forthcoming),
ﬁnd little evidence that direct barriers to investment explain U.S.
investors’ portfolios; rather, information costs associated with foreign
companies, regulatory and accounting environments, and ﬁnancial
information may play a role. Using data from the U.S. asset surveys of
1994 and 1997, they ﬁnd that U.S. investors are signiﬁcantly more
likely to hold equities of foreign ﬁrms that have reduced such costs by
publicly listing securities in the United States.
1. Distribution of U.S. holdings of foreign debt securities, by currency of denomination, December 31, 1997 and 2001




Amount Percent Amount Percent Amount Percent
U .S .dollar ......................... 315 58 334 67 123 84
Euro1 .............................. 75 14 90 18 7 5
Y en................................ 30 5 25 5 12 8
Canadian dollar .................... 42 8 22411
U.K. pound ........................ 26 5 16332
Other .............................. 39 7 15310
Unknown .......................... 20 4 * 0* 0
Total .............................. 547 100 502 100 147 100
Note. Here and in the following tables, components may not sum to totals
because of rounding.
1. Amount for 1997 is denominated in the former national currencies of
countries now in the euro area (for those countries, see general note to chart 4).
*Less than $500 million.
Source. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Report on U.S. Holdings of For-
eign Securities, Foreign Portfolio Investment Benchmark Surveys (May 2003),
p.11 (www.treas.gov/tic/shc2001r.pdf).
2. U.S. holdings of foreign equities: Market value and percentage of the foreign equity market, by selected country of origin
and for all foreign countries, 1994, 1997, and 2001
Billions of dollars except as noted
Country or region
March 1994 December 1997 December 2001
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
United Kingdom ................... 100 8.2 218 10.9 350 15.8
Euroarea .......................... 130 7.4 376 12.5 462 10.7
Canada ............................ 40 12.6 71 12.5 90 12.8
Japan .............................. 99 2.6 136 6.2 171 7.6
OtherAsia ......................... 51 3.4 75 5.3 131 6.3
Other .............................. 147 9.4 332 12.7 410 16.9
All ................................ 567 5.6 1,208 10.2 1,613 11.5
Note. For the size of the foreign equity market, see source note to chart 4.
For countries in the euro area and in other Asia, see general note to chart 4.
Recent Developments in Cross-Border Investment in Securities 25America) with low and declining credit rates and
volatile returns.14
With the method used above for foreign portfolios,
we can measure the relative weights of foreign equi-
ties and foreign long-term debt in U.S. portfolios.
Although the share of the aggregate U.S. portfolio
held in foreign equities rose between 1994 and 2001,
it remained relatively underweight in foreign equities
(chart 8, bars labeled ‘‘All’’). The increase in share
of all foreign equities was associated with increases
in holdings of Japanese, U.K., euro-area, and other
Asian equities. In contrast, the U.S. portfolio weight
of Canadian equities decreased a bit, from 0.30 to
0.26, over this period.
U.S. investors remain notably more underweight in
holdings of foreign long-term debt than in holdings
of foreign equities. The relative weight of all foreign
long-term debt holdings in the United States barely
increased, from 0.06 to 0.08, between 1994 and 1997
and then slipped back to 0.07 by 2001 (chart 9,
bars labeled ‘‘All’’). Relative to their holdings of all
foreign long-term debt securities, U.S. investors are
considerably less underweight in holdings of Cana-
dian securities and slightly less underweight in hold-
ings of U.K. securities. The limited participation
of U.S. investors in foreign long-term debt mar-
kets may partly reﬂect their apparent preference for
securities denominated in U.S. dollars. Indeed, this
preference may account for the larger U.S. portfolio
weight of Canadian long-term debt: In 2001, roughly
two-thirds of Canadian international long-term
debt was denominated in U.S. dollars, whereas only
8 percent of all international long-term debt was
14. John D. Burger and Francis E. Warnock, ‘‘Diversiﬁcation,
Original Sin, and International Bond Portfolios,’’ International
Finance Discussion Papers 755 (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, January 2003).
3. U.S. holdings of foreign long-term debt: Market value and percentage of the foreign long-term debt market, by selected
country of origin and for all foreign countries, 1994, 1997, and 2001
Billions of dollars except as noted
Country or region
March 1994 December 1997 December 2001
Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
United Kingdom ................... 20 3.7 54 6.3 72 5.5
Euroarea .......................... 87 1.9 116 2.0 137 2.0
Canada ............................ 69 14.7 107 18.2 105 16.4
Japan .............................. 32 .8 30 .8 25 .5
OtherAsia ......................... 9 2.2 41 5.8 21 1.5
Other .............................. 93 5.0 200 8.9 143 5.5
All ................................ 304 2.6 547 3.9 502 2.9
Note. For the size of the foreign long-term debt market, see text note 5.
For countries in the euro area and in other Asia, see general note to chart 4.
8. Relative weight of foreign equities in U.S. equity  
portfolio, by selected country of origin and for all  
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9. Relative weight of foreign long-term debt in U.S. long-  
term debt portfolio, by selected country of origin and for  
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26 Federal Reserve Bulletin Winter 2004dollar-denominated.15 Another possible reason for
the relatively low measure of U.S. holdings of foreign
long-term debt is that such holdings may not fully
account for U.S. holdings of foreign bearer bonds,
which are difﬁcult to measure.
CHARACTERISTICS AND LEVELS OF U.S. AND
FOREIGN HOLDINGS
The composition of U.S. holdings of foreign securi-
ties is quite different from that of foreign holdings of
U.S. securities. U.S. investors have primarily held
foreign equities, and their preference for equities has
increased over the period during which the United
States has conducted asset surveys. If we consider
only U.S. holdings of foreign long-term securities
(the 2001 survey was the ﬁrst to measure holdings of
short-term securities), we ﬁnd that as of the end of
March 1994, 65 percent of U.S. foreign holdings
were equity securities; the share increased to 69 per-
cent as of year-end 1997 and to 76 percent as of
year-end 2001. In sharp contrast, foreign investors
primarily hold U.S. debt securities. Again consider-
ing only long-term securities, we see that during the
period covered by U.S. surveys of foreign holdings
(1974–2002), the proportion of equities in foreign
holdings was 36 percent in December 1974, varied
in the ensuing years between 31 percent and 48 per-
cent, and was 37 percent in June 2002. Much of this
ﬂuctuation appears to be due to booms and busts in
the U.S. equity markets rather than to a change in the
pattern of foreign investment ﬂows.
Another difference between U.S. and foreign inves-
tors is the relative participation of private and ofﬁcial
investors. Foreign ofﬁcial investors accounted for a
signiﬁcant though declining share of foreign hold-
ings of U.S. securities over the period, representing
41 percent of all foreign holdings in 1974 and 20 per-
cent in June 2002. In contrast, private investors
account for almost all U.S. holdings of foreign long-
term securities.
The holdings of foreign ofﬁcial institutions, com-
posed primarily of debt securities, help to explain the
difference in the share of equities in U.S. and foreign
cross-border portfolios. But even if these holdings
are excluded, the share of foreign equities in U.S.
investors’ cross-border portfolios is still well above
that of U.S. equities in the portfolios of foreign
investors.
The market value of foreign holdings of U.S. long-
term securities has long exceeded that of U.S. hold-
ings of foreign long-term securities (table 4). From
December 1994 to November 2003 the difference
widened, as the ratio of U.S. holdings to foreign
holdings declined from 0.76 to 0.40.
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE MEASUREMENT OF
CROSS-BORDER INVESTMENT IN SECURITIES
As cross-border security ﬂows have become increas-
ingly important, efforts to improve the measurement
of these data have intensiﬁed. These efforts took on
greater urgency in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial
crises of 1997–98, when the lack of relevant and
comprehensive data on the external debt and reserve
assets of many emerging-market countries was
widely perceived as contributing not only to the
severity of the crises and but also to the absence of
forewarning.
These efforts to improve the quality of data have
mainly occurred under the auspices of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF has also
sought to have these data produced within a consis-
tent framework and in a more transparent manner.
These efforts have prompted signiﬁcant changes in
15. Data are from BIS international debt statistics, available at
www.bis.org/statistics/secstats.htm. The BIS deﬁnition of interna-
tional long-term debt securities differs from the survey deﬁnition of
foreign long-term debt securities in that, in addition to all securities
issued in foreign countries, the BIS deﬁnition includes securities
issued domestically by resident ﬁrms that are denominated in foreign
currencies or that are speciﬁcally targeted at nonresident investors.
See Bank for International Settlements, ‘‘Guide to the International
Financial Statistics,’’ BIS Papers, no. 14, pp. 13–14, available at
www.bis.org/publ/bispap14.pdf.
4. Market value of U.S. holdings of foreign long-term
securities and of foreign holdings of U.S. long-term
securities, selected dates, 1994–2003














Dec. 19941 ... 9492 1,244 .76 295
Dec. 1997 ... 1,755 2,632 2 .67 877
Mar. 2000 ... 2,490 2 3,558 .70 1,068
Dec. 2001 ... 2,115 3,970 2 .53 1,855
June 2002 ... 2,050 2 3,926 .52 1,876
Dec. 2002 ... 1,847 2 4,149 2 .45 2,302
Nov. 2003 ... 1,804 2 4,554 2 .40 2,750
1. December 1994 was chosen as the start date because the ﬁrst survey of
U.S. holdings of foreign securities was conducted in March 1994 (thus,
estimates for earlier dates are unreliable), and a survey of foreign holdings of
U.S. securities was conducted as of year-end 1994.
2. Estimate. Year-end estimates are from the Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis; all others are from the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. For each date except December 2002 and November
2003, one position was measured by an asset or liabilities survey and the other
by adding transactions adjusted for changes in prices and exchange rates to the
amounts measured by the last such survey. For December 2002 and Novem-
ber 2003, both positions are estimated.
Source. U.S. Treasury, Report on U.S. Holdings of Foreign Securities, vari-
ous years.
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securities activity. For example, surveys of portfolio
assets and liabilities are now conducted annually, and
the U.S. measurement system is increasingly becom-
ing part of an integrated worldwide system.
Recent Efforts to Improve Asset Data
Internationally coordinated efforts to improve data
on assets (holdings of foreign securities by domestic
residents) preceded serious efforts to improve liabili-
ties data. IMF-led studies of the accuracy of cross-
border ﬁnancial information concluded that, for secu-
rities, measures of worldwide cross-border assets
were signiﬁcantly less than corresponding measures
of liabilities despite the fact that these measures
should be equal.16 To help address this apparent
undercount of assets, the IMF organized a Coordi-
nated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) to be con-
ducted as of year-end 1997. Twenty-nine countries
participated in the survey, which increased the world-
wide level of measured holdings of portfolio assets
from $6.9 trillion to $7.7 trillion. The perceived
success of this effort and the desire for further
improvements led to a second coordinated survey as
of year-end 2001 and to an agreement to conduct
such surveys annually.17 For the 2001 survey, the
number of participating countries more than doubled,
to sixty-seven, and the level of measured assets also
rose sharply, to $12.6 trillion.
Despite the improvements in measurement arising
from the surveys, however, worldwide measured
assets have remained well below worldwide mea-
sured liabilities. Data compiled by the IMF show that
the percentage difference between measured assets
and measured liabilities is dropping but is still quite
large, and the absolute difference is growing (table 5).
Further, these ﬁgures probably understate the discrep-
ancy, as the IMF believes that worldwide liabilities
may be signiﬁcantly underestimated because of a
variety of measurement problems.18
At least four factors are believed to contribute to
the undercount of assets. First, some major investing
countries either do not conduct asset surveys or con-
duct surveys whose quality could be improved. Sec-
ond, asset surveys measure holdings of foreign secu-
rities by domestic residents and tend to collect data
from large, institutional units. Thus, foreign holdings
not owned by or entrusted to large domestic institu-
tions will typically be missed. In total, such holdings
may be sizable. (Below we discuss a partial solution
to this problem.) The third problem is bearer bonds.
Because of a dearth of information about the owners
of these securities, the amounts held by residents of
each country must be estimated and may well be
undercounted. Finally, investors may wish to obscure
their asset holdings in a variety of ways—which may
include holding bearer bonds—to avoid paying taxes.
Although the ﬁrst of these four points is also true
of the measurement of liabilities, the others are
unique to the measurement of assets. Whereas lia-
bilities consist of foreign holdings of domestic
securities—which, because they are registered with
public authorities, are typically easy to identify—
assets are often held by individual investors whose
activities are unknown to data compilers. Bearer
bonds issued by domestic residents are likewise eas-
ily identiﬁed and counted as liabilities (though the
foreign-held amounts must be estimated), but hold-
ings of foreign bearer bonds by domestic residents
are extremely difﬁcult to identify. And although
investors may hide their asset holdings to avoid pay-
ing taxes, issuers of domestic securities can usually
16. See International Monetary Fund, Final Report of the Working
Party on Statistical Discrepancies in the World Current Account
Balance (1987) (Estava Report) and Final Report of the Working
Party on the Measurement of International Capital Flows (1992)
(Godeaux Report).
17. The IMF consolidates the data from these surveys and posts
them, along with analytic tables, on its web site (see www.imf.org/
external/np/sta/pi/cpis.htm). Also available at the site are explanations
of the survey techniques of participating countries and directions for
obtaining additional information. 18. In its analysis of the difference between estimated assets and
estimated liabilities in the worldwide portfolio as of year-end 2001,
the IMF stated:
The estimate for portfolio investment liabilities outstanding is
more likely to be underestimated than overestimated because
(a) some major ﬁnancial centers do not measure their portfolio
investment liabilities; (b) there is a tendency for portfolio invest-
ment liabilities (in country International Investment Position
statements) to be reported at nominal values rather than at current
market prices; and (c) part of the estimate is derived from the
summing of ﬂows, which, over the long term, for equities, in
particular, tend to underestimate the current market value. The
net result is that the under-coverage of assets in the CPIS may be
signiﬁcantly larger than $2.4 trillion.
See www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/globaldi.htm.
5. Estimates of worldwide holdings of securities,
December 31, 1997 and 2001





1997 ....... 7.7 9.3 1.6 18
2001 ....... 12.6 15.0 2.4 16
Source. International Monetary Fund, Statistics Department.
28 Federal Reserve Bulletin Winter 2004treat interest and dividend payments as tax deduc-
tions. For these reasons, the overall level of measured
liabilities is probably more accurate than that of
measured assets, but the geographic attribution of
measured assets is superior to that of measured
liabilities.
Recent Efforts to Improve Liabilities Data
For many countries, foreign holdings of securities are
a primary component of their external debt positions.
IMF-led efforts to improve these data resulted, ﬁrst,
in an expanded system for reporting reserve asset
positions and, later, in a comprehensive plan for
measuring external debt. Both reporting systems have
been integrated into an existing IMF system known
as the Special Data Dissemination Standard, or
SDDS.19 To meet the requirements of the external
debt reporting system, the United States has begun to
conduct annual surveys of foreign holdings of U.S.
securities and has made other system modiﬁcations.
The external debt reporting system began operating
as of September 30, 2003.
An important aspect of the SDDS is that the IMF,
with country approval, conducts periodic in-country
reviews of the methods and procedures that each
country uses to compile data.20 These reviews cover
areas such as methodological soundness, data accu-
racy and reliability, the independence and integrity of
compilers, the strength of the legal framework autho-
rizing data collections, and, in some cases, the views
of private-sector data users on the overall reliability
and usefulness of each country’s data. The IMF pro-
duces reports of ﬁndings and, again with country
approval, publishes the reports on its web site. The
IMF’s site does not indicate instances in which a
country chose not to have the report of ﬁndings
published.
PROBLEM AREAS AND IMPROVEMENT
INITIATIVES
Most avenues currently under consideration to
improve cross-border securities data involve inter-
nationally coordinated efforts, as countries face both
practical and theoretical limits to what they can do
with only domestic sources of information.
As noted above, a gap in the current international
measurement system involves holdings of foreign
securities entrusted to nonresident institutions for
safekeeping. For example, a resident of country A
may buy a security issued by a resident of country B
and entrust the safekeeping of this security to a bank
in country B. If a large domestic institution owns
these holdings, then they will probably be captured
by country A’s portfolio asset surveys, as these sur-
veys typically collect information from large domes-
tic end-investors, or large domestic custodians, or
both. But if smaller institutional units or private
individuals own these holdings, then they will prob-
ably not be reported on country A’s asset surveys.
However, they will in all likelihood be captured
on the liabilities survey of country B, creating an
asymmetry between measured assets and measured
liabilities.
Further, if the resident of country A instead entrusts
the security to a custodian bank in country C, then
these holdings will most likely be recorded by coun-
try B as liabilities vis-a `-vis country C. These hold-
ings will not be included in the asset survey of
country C, as asset surveys at present measure only
holdings of foreign securities by domestic residents
and exclude holdings of foreign securities by foreign
residents. To address this problem, counterparty
countries must collect the relevant data and exchange
this information with authorities in investor coun-
tries. In many cases such reporting would require
counterparty countries to enhance their reporting sys-
tems. Steps to rectify this gap are still in the early
stages, but concerned parties are increasingly recog-
nizing the need to address the issue.
Another problem mentioned above is the difﬁculty
of obtaining accurate geographic attribution of liabili-
ties data. Because countries can accurately determine
the geography of their asset holdings but not that of
their liabilities, the obvious solution is to use asset
data from counterparty countries to determine the
geography of each country’s foreign liabilities. How-
ever, such comparisons are best done when countries
conduct simultaneous asset and liabilities surveys
and when countries have sufﬁcient faith in counter-
party asset surveys to feel comfortable using these
data in place of their own measurements of liabilities.
Although many countries are improving the quality
of their asset surveys, the U.S. liabilities surveys are
not synchronized with them. The coordinated asset
surveys are conducted as of December 31, whereas
the U.S. liabilities surveys are conducted as of
June 30, a disjunction that somewhat reduces the
19. For more information, see dsbb.imf.org/Applications/web/
sddshome.
20. The IMF review system is called Reports on the Observance
of Standards and Codes, or ROSCs (www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/
rosc.asp). Reviews are conducted for countries subscribing to the
SDDS and to the less rigorous General Data Dissemination System
(GDDS).
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States.21
SUMMARY
Now that asset and liabilities surveys are conducted
annually, U.S. data on cross-border securities hold-
ings should be on more solid footing. Survey data are
more timely and are becoming increasingly reliable
as survey reporters gain experience in providing these
data. However, problems with the geographic attribu-
tion of liabilities data will remain unresolved at least
for the short term.
Many other countries, urged on by organizations
such as the IMF, have notably improved the quality
and transparency of their measurement systems.
Data collectors will likely make further signiﬁcant
improvements in the next few years, but problems
such as the worldwide undercount of assets are far
from being resolved.
APPENDIX:C OMPARING U.S. AND FOREIGN
MEASUREMENT OF HOLDINGS OF U.S.
SECURITIES
To further assess the extent to which foreign coun-
tries own U.S. securities, one may compare the results
of U.S. liabilities surveys to the foreign holdings of
U.S. securities reported in the 1997 and 2001 Coordi-
nated Investment Portfolio Surveys (CPIS), orga-
nized by the IMF.22 The country asset surveys show
holdings of U.S. securities as well as each country’s
holdings of all foreign securities, so the data are
particularly useful for comparing a given country’s
exposure to U.S. securities with its foreign exposure
more generally. The asset surveys may also provide
more accurate information on holdings of U.S. securi-
ties by nonresident custodians in a given country.
For example, the U.S. liabilities surveys may over-
estimate holdings in international ﬁnancial centers,
where such custodians frequently are located, and
consequently these surveys may underestimate hold-
ings for the countries of the actual owners of these
securities. To the extent that the CPIS asset surveys
are able to properly allocate holdings by nonresident
custodians, they may be able to give a more accurate
picture of the country distribution of foreign holdings
of U.S. securities.
On the other hand, the set of countries that con-
ducted asset surveys is not as large as the set of
countries to which we can attribute ownership in
the U.S. liabilities surveys, so the universe of foreign
holders will underestimate total holdings of U.S.
securities. For example, China, a major holder from
our liabilities surveys, has not conducted asset sur-
veys. Another important difference for the 2001 asset
surveys is that the publicly released country-level
data from these surveys exclude holdings of foreign
securities held as foreign exchange reserves.23 Such
liabilities to foreigners are included in the U.S. liabili-
ties surveys.24 Differences in survey techniques may
also result in differences in reported holdings between
the two types of surveys; for example, not all coun-
tries conduct security-level surveys, the technique
generally believed to be the most accurate. Finally,
the difference in timing between the December 2001
assets surveys and the June 2002 liabilities survey
can result in differences in reported holdings to the
extent that there were net purchases or sales of U.S.
securities and changes in the market value of the
securities over the six-month period.
For U.S. equities, the change in market value dur-
ing this time is likely to be especially important, as
broad U.S. equity indexes fell about 14 percent in the
ﬁrst half of 2002. For foreign holdings of U.S. long-
term debt, the more signiﬁcant difference is likely
to come from securities transactions, as foreign resi-
dents purchased a net total of about $230 billion in
U.S. long-term debt securities over the period.
To construct the foreign portfolios and shares held
in U.S. assets shown in charts 5 and 6, we use
information from the CPIS asset surveys and from
the U.S. liabilities surveys. For holdings of all foreign
equities and of U.S. equities, we use the reported
amounts in the CPIS surveys. For holdings of long-
term debt securities, we augment the total reported
foreign holdings of long-term securities with IMF
estimates of total reserve holdings to construct the
21. Many U.S. survey reporters were concerned that conducting
both surveys as of year-end would place an undue burden on their
resources. In response, the United States staggered the schedule for
collecting these data.
22. For availability of reports, see text note 17.
23. For 2001, securities held as reserves are reported separately in
the IMF’s Survey of Geographical Distribution of Securities Held as
Foreign Exchange Reserves (SEFER) and not on the CPIS. In the
1997 survey, some countries reported reserve holdings in their CPIS
survey, while others reported reserves separately on the SEFER.
For details on coverage of the CPIS and the SEFER, see ‘‘Portfolio
Investment: CPIS Data: Notes and Deﬁnitions,’’ available at
www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/notes.htm.
24. The CPIS collected reserve asset holdings separately from
other holdings. The U.S. liabilities surveys measure ofﬁcial holdings
separately from other holdings. Although foreign ofﬁcial investors are
primarily speciﬁc organizations in each country that would be
expected to hold their country’s reserve assets, the deﬁnition of
ofﬁcial holdings is broader than that of reserve assets. Published data
from the U.S. liabilities surveys do not show ofﬁcial holdings sepa-
rately from other holdings by country, although we are able to identify
these holdings for our analyses.
30 Federal Reserve Bulletin Winter 2004total foreign portfolio in each country. For holdings
of long-term U.S. securities, we compare the reported
CPIS amounts with the amounts in the U.S. liabilities
survey, adjusted for net securities purchases during
the six-month difference in reporting periods. For
countries whose reported CPIS amounts are greater
than the U.S. liabilities numbers, we use the CPIS
amounts. Although these ﬁgures may be underesti-
mates of true holdings of U.S. long-term securities
for these countries, as they exclude reserve holdings
in U.S. securities, they suggest that our liabilities
survey produces an even greater underestimate of
nonreserve holdings for these countries. For coun-
tries for which the U.S. liabilities survey estimates
of holdings are greater, we use the U.S. liabilities
amounts. Overall, we ﬁnd that our liabilities survey
estimates of foreign holdings of U.S. securities are
larger than the total reported on the asset surveys.
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